Research

Working Papers

2026

1. The voluntary adoption of biodegradable fishing gear: An experimental investigation of refundable deposits with heterogeneous agents
   with Todd L. Cherry, Huu-Luat Do, and David M. McEvoy
   Under Review, 2026.
   ABS

   Voluntary adoption of sustainable practices is essential for addressing environmental problems such as marine pollution and ghost fishing caused by abandoned, lost, or discarded fishing gear (ALDFG). Yet sustaining compliance within voluntary agreements remains a key challenge. This study uses laboratory experiments to assess refundable deposit mechanisms in voluntary agreements to adopt biodegradable fishing gear. Participants were assigned to one of four treatments: a baseline with no agreement, a no-deposit agreement, an agreement with partially deterrent deposits, and an agreement with fully deterrent deposits. Agreements formed only if a minimum participation threshold was met, and deposits were refunded only when members fulfilled their commitments. Results reveal a trade-off between participation and compliance: no-deposit agreements form more frequently but yield lower adoption. Deposit-refund mechanisms improve compliance and adoption, with the fully deterrent deposit treatment performing best, particularly among large players. These findings underscore the importance of incentive-compatible enforcement in designing effective voluntary environmental programs.

2. Asymmetric Contests with Investment: Theory and Experiments
   with Todd L. Cherry
   Under Review, 2026.
   ABS

   Contests are central to the allocation of scarce resources, and preparation through investment is an important feature of these competitive environments. While theoretical models demonstrate that pre-contest investment can alter strategic balance, empirical evidence on behavior in asymmetric settings is limited. We develop a game-theoretic framework to examine how first-stage cost asymmetry influences pre-contest investment, contest effort, and resulting success probabilities and payoffs. We evaluate these predictions using a laboratory experiment with symmetric, low asymmetry, and high asymmetry treatment conditions. Results indicate that behavior under symmetry aligns well with theoretical benchmarks. As cost asymmetry increases, strategic divergence between heterogenous contestants emerges through changes in contest effort rather than initial investment. Investment remains stable across treatments and roles, while effort rises for advantaged contestants but remains indistinguishable from baseline for disadvantaged contestants. Escalated effort from advantaged players combined with investment stability across roles drives outcome disparities higher under high asymmetry. These findings suggest that initial cost imbalances reinforce inequality in outcomes without altering structural investment.

Publications

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